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Abstract According to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one’s belief
could not easily have been false. An important issue for the account is whether we should
only examine the target belief when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. In this paper, it
is argued that, if we should only examine the target belief, then the account fails to account
for ignorance of necessary truths. But, if we should also examine beliefs in other relevant
propositions, then the account fails to account for knowledge from falsehood. Therefore, the
safety account of knowledge is undermined by knowledge from falsehood and ignorance of
necessary truths.
Keywords Epistemic luck · Inference · Knowledge · Knowledge from
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1. Introduction
In many Gettier cases, the target belief is inferred from a false belief. As a result, some
epistemologists attempted to solve the Gettier problem by supplementing the JTB analysis of
knowledge with a “no-false-lemmas” clause according to which one’s belief is not inferred
from any falsehood (Armstrong, 1973; Harman, 1973; Lehrer, 1965, 1974; Lycan, 2006).
However, the resulting account is too strong1 to accommodate cases in which a true belief
1 It is also too weak to the extent that there are cases in which a justified true belief satisfies the
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counts as knowledge despite its being inferred from a false belief.2
The safety account of knowledge produces a welcome result in cases of knowledge from
falsehood. The idea behind the account is that in order to know, one’s belief could not easily
have been false. In short, the belief should be true not only in the actual case, but also in other
similar cases (where one forms it in the same way as in the actual case). According to the
safety account, a belief that satisfies this condition counts as knowledge unless it exhibits
some non-modal shortcomings that would deprive it of the status of knowledge.
In a case of knowledge from falsehood, the reason why the true belief counts as knowledge
despite its being inferred from a false belief is that the belief in the target proposition, unlike
the true belief in a Gettier case, could not easily have been false.3
When evaluating whether a belief is safe or not, it was thought that it was enough to
examine the belief in the target proposition in similar cases (Sosa, 1999a, b). However, cases
where one forms a belief in a necessary truth (or a modally robust contingent truth) calls into
question such an account, because such a belief is trivially safe, i.e., the target proposition is
true in all possible worlds and, a fortiori, true in all nearby possible worlds where one
believes it. Nonetheless, such a belief could still fall short of knowledge despite satisfying
other non-modal conditions on knowledge. It was then suggested that we should also take
beliefs in other relevant propositions in similar cases into consideration when evaluating
whether the belief in the target proposition is safe or not. What results from this suggestion is
a globalized version of the safety condition. A belief in a target proposition is globally safe if
“no-false-lemmas” clause despite falling short of knowledge. See Feldman (1974).
2 For arguments that there are no cases of knowledge from falsehood, see Ball & Blome-Tillmann (2014),
Borges (2020), Montiminy (2014), Schnee (2015). I will consider one such argument in section 4.
3 A similar point is made by Warfield (2005) where he argues that the belief is not accidentally/luckily true in a
case of knowledge from falsehood.
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and only if the subject could not easily have falsely believed not only the target proposition
but also the relevant propositions on her actual basis of the belief. This handles the problems
incurred by necessary truths nicely: though the subject could not easily have falsely believed
the target proposition, the subject could easily have falsely believed some other relevant
proposition (Blome-Tillmann, 2017; Grundmann, 2020; Hirvelä, 2019; Manley, 2007;
Pritchard, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2016; Williamson, 2000, 2009).
Though the non-globalized safety condition is satisfied in cases of knowledge from
falsehood, a remaining issue is whether the globalized safety condition is also satisfied. In
this paper, I argue that knowledge from falsehood and ignorance of necessary truths
constitute two horns of a dilemma for the safety account of knowledge. If the account is
globalized to account for ignorance of necessary truths, then it fails to explain why
knowledge from falsehood is possible. But, if the account is not globalized, though it
accounts for knowledge from falsehood, it fails to explain why not all beliefs in necessary
truths count as knowledge. Therefore, the safety account of knowledge is undermined by
knowledge from falsehood and ignorance of necessary truths.
2. Knowledge from Falsehood and Safety
Consider a classical Gettier case:
“Smith and Jones have applied for a particular job. But Smith has been told by the
company president that Jones will be hired. Smith combines that testimony with his
observational evidence of there being ten coins in Jones’s pocket. (He had counted
them—an odd but imaginable circumstance.) He infers the belief that whoever will get
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the job has ten coins in their pocket. For convenience, call that belief b. It enjoys a
reasonable amount of evidential support—from some testimony, observation, and
reasoning. Belief b is also true—yet not in the way Smith was expecting it to be true. For
he will get the job, and he has ten coins in his pocket. (Neither of those circumstances
was known by Smith.) Does he thereby fail to know that the person who will get the job
has ten coins in his pocket? Surely so (thought Gettier): belief b is true and justified—but
not knowledge. Hence, JTB is false: this case establishes that being true and justified is
not sufficient for being knowledge” (Hetherington, 2011, p. 120).4
In this case, Smith has a justified true belief that whoever will get the job has ten coins in
their pocket. However, the belief is true as a matter of luck and thus does not count as
knowledge. After all, it is true because the dose of bad luck that Jones will not be hired is
canceled out by the good luck that Smith will be hired and there are ten coins in his pocket.
Given that the belief is inferred from falsehood, i.e., Jones will be hired and there are ten
coins in Jones’ pocket, a reasonable idea is that, if we supplement the JTB analysis of
knowledge with a “no-false-lemmas” clause according to which one’s belief is not inferred
from any falsehood, then the above case could be handled nicely. After all, the belief is
inferred from falsehood and thus does not satisfy the “no-false-lemmas” clause.
The bad news is that there are cases in which a true belief counts as knowledge despite
its being inferred from a false belief. To illustrate, consider the following case:
SPEEDOMETER: Angela regularly accepts what the speedometer in her car says at face
value. Her present belief, so formed, is that she is driving at 79 mph though she is
4 The case is originated from Gettier (1963).
5
actually driving at 74 mph. The problem is that the speedometer usually does not get the
speed right exactly but diverges by a few miles from the true number. The error could be
as large as 5 mph. Angela sees a posted speed limit of 60 mph and goes on to infer that
she is driving above 60 mph.5
Intuitively, Angela’s belief that she is driving above 60 mph counts as knowledge though it is
inferred from the falsehood that she is driving at 79 mph.
This case shows that the no-false-lemmas account is too strong as an account of
knowledge. In contrast, the safety account of knowledge handles the case nicely. According
to this account, the safety condition is a necessary condition on knowledge that helps to
eliminate knowledge-precluding luck. S knows that p only if S’s belief that p is safe, that is,
only if S could not easily have falsely believed p. To put it formally,
SAFETY: S’s belief that p, formed on basis B, is safe, if and only if, in all nearby
possible worlds where S forms a belief that p on basis B, p is true.6
This makes us consider whether p is true in nearby possible worlds where S believes that p. If
p is false in some of these possible worlds, then S’s belief in p is unsafe. Thus, the belief is
luckily true and S does not know that p. If p is true in all these possible worlds, then S’s belief
5 This case is adapted from Baumann (2014) and Murphy (2015) though for a different purpose. For other cases
of knowledge from falsehood, see Arnold (2013), Buford & Cloos (2018), Clark (1963), de Almeida (2017), Feit
& Cullison (2011), Fitelson (2010), Hawthorne & Rabinowitz (2017), Hiller (2013), Hilpinen (1988), Klein
(2008), Saunders & Champawat (1964), Turri (2012, 2019), Warfield (2005).
6 The safety condition is sometimes relativized to the belief-formation methods rather than the basis of beliefs.
See Blome-Tillmann (2020) for cases where the two versions of the safety condition come apart. For discussions
of the individuation of the basis of beliefs/the belief-formation methods, see Alfano (2009), Becker (2012),
Bernecker (2020), Black & Murphy (2007), Bogardus & Marxen (2014), Broncano-Berrocal (2014), and
Hirvelä (2019). In this paper, I shall not delve into the issue of how to relativize the condition. Proponents of the
safety condition on knowledge include Ball (2016), Beddor & Pavese (2020), Dutant (2010, 2016), Greco
(2012), Grundmann (2020), Hirvelä (2017, 2019), Lasonen-Aarnio (2010), Luper (2003, 2006a, 2006b),
Luper-Foy (1984), Manley (2007), Peet & Pitcovski (2018), Pritchard (2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013,
2016), Sainsbury (1997), Sosa (1999a, 1999b, 2003, 2007, 2009), Wedgwood (2020), and Williamson (2000,
2009).
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in p is safe. Thus, the belief is non-luckily true and S knows that p unless it exhibits some
non-modal shortcomings, e.g., the belief is not virtuously formed, that would
deprive it of the status of knowledge.
Angela knows that she is driving above 60 mph because the belief is safe. Given that the
error of the speedometer is under 5 mph, there is no nearby possible world in which she
believes so on the same basis, i.e., inference from the belief that she is driving at 79 mph,
while she is driving under 60 mph. Despite its being inferred from falsehood, the belief could
not easily have been false!
In sum, beliefs inferred from falsehood do not necessarily fall short of knowledge. The
safety account of knowledge, unlike the no-false-lemmas account of knowledge, does a nice
job to handle cases of knowledge from falsehood. The insight is that a belief inferred from
falsehood could turn out to be safe.
3. Ignorance of Necessary Truths and Globalized Safety
We not only form beliefs in contingent truths but also form beliefs in necessary truths,
e.g., 2 + 2 = 4, there is an infinite number of prime numbers, water is H2O, etc. Like beliefs in
contingent truths, many beliefs in necessary truth are true as a matter of luck and thus do not
count as knowledge. For instance,
CALCULATOR: “Sam looks at a [broken] calculator which tells him that 131,071 is a
prime number, and on this basis Sam comes to believe (truly) that 131,071 is indeed
prime” (Roland & Cogburn, 2011, p. 554).
Since 131,071 is prime is a necessary truth, it is true in all possible worlds and, a fortiori, true
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in all nearby possible worlds where Sam believes it. This makes his belief trivially safe on
SAFETY. However, the belief is true as a matter of luck and thus does not count as
knowledge. This causes a problem for SAFETY which is supposed to be a necessary
condition on knowledge that helps to eliminate knowledge-precluding luck.7
Though Sam could not easily have formed a false belief in the target proposition, he
could easily have formed a false belief in a different proposition. Since the calculator is
broken, he may as well believe something like 131,071 is a composite number by using the
calculator. The insight is that we should also examine beliefs in other relevant propositions in
addition to beliefs in the target proposition when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. As
Duncan Pritchard writes,
“the safety principle, properly understood at any rate, is concerned not with the safety of
a belief that p (i.e., the proposition actually believed), but rather with the safety of a
relevant doxastic output of a belief-forming process (which, while resulting in a belief
that p in the actual world, could result in a belief in a different proposition in a near-by
possible world). In this way, possible worlds where this process results in a different
doxastic output from that which results in the actual world – such as a belief that q rather
than that p – can be relevant to the safety of the belief” (Pritchard, 2016, p. 36).
If SAFETY is globalized to a set of propositions rather than the target proposition, then Sam’s
7 For similar arguments, see Becker (2007), Blome-Tillmann (2017), Collin (2018), Dietz & Hawthorne
(forthcoming), Hales (2016), Levy (2011), Melchior (2017, 2021), Miščević (2007). Bernecker (2011),
Broncano-Berrocal (2019), Freitag (2014), Greco (2016), Hiller & Neta (2007), Hirvelä (2017, 2019), Kripke
(2011), Paterson (2020), Stone (2013), and Zhao (forthcoming) also argue that in addition to necessary truths,
modally robust contingent truths, which are true in all nearby possible worlds, cause the same problem for
SAFETY.
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belief that 131,071 is a prime number turns out to be unsafe which accounts for why it is true
as a matter of luck and thus does not count as knowledge. This seems to be a satisfactory
solution to the problem incurred by beliefs in necessary truths. The remaining issue is how to
determine which propositions are relevant when evaluating whether a belief is safe. After all,
there must be some constraint on which propositions are relevant. Otherwise, a belief can
hardly be safe as the subject always could easily have formed a false belief in some
proposition.
The safety theorists such as Duncan Pritchard have proposed solutions to how the set of
relevant propositions is constrained. According to Pritchard’s solution, the set of propositions
is constrained by the basis of the belief. We should only consider beliefs that are formed on
the same basis while beliefs formed on a different basis are irrelevant when evaluating
whether the belief in the target proposition is safe.8 To put it formally,
GLOBALIZED SAFETYP: S’s belief that p, formed on basis B, is safe, if and only if, in
all nearby possible worlds where S forms a belief on basis B, S’s belief is true (Pritchard,
2009, 2012, 2013, 2016).
GLOBALIZED SAFETYP handles CALCULATOR nicely: though Sam could not easily
have formed a false belief that 131,071 is a prime number, he could easily have formed a
false belief that 131,071 is a composite number on the same basis as that in the actual case.
Therefore, his belief in the target proposition is unsafe and thus does not count as knowledge.
8 This is motivated by his anti-luck epistemology according to which the safety condition is the anti-luck
condition on knowledge. As he argues, when evaluating whether an event is lucky, we should consider nearby
possible worlds where the relevant initial conditions for that event are the same as that in the actual world.
When the event is the formation of a belief, the relevant initial conditions turn out to be the basis of that belief.
See Pritchard (2005, 2007, 2012).
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4. Is Knowledge from Falsehood Globally Safe?
If, as SAFETY suggests, the safety condition is concerned with the modal profile of a
belief in the target proposition, then the safety account successfully explains why
SPEEDOMETER is a case of knowledge. However, as GLOBALIZED SAFETYP suggests,
the safety condition is concerned with the modal profile of the relevant doxastic output of the
belief-forming process. Otherwise, the safety account fails to explain why CALCULATOR is
not a case of knowledge.
The remaining issue is whether GLOBALIZED SAFETYP accommodates
SPEEDOMETER. In that case, Angela forms the belief that she is driving above 60 mph on
the basis of inference from the belief that she is driving at 79 mph. Consider a nearby
possible world in which Angela is still driving at 74 mph and the speedometer is as reliable as
that in the actual world. As a result, the speedometer still indicates 79 mph. The only
difference is that Angela wonders whether the speed is above 75 mph rather than 60 mph. In
that world, Angela goes on to infer that she is driving above 75 mph. Unlike her actual belief
that she is driving above 60 mph, this belief is false because she is driving at 74 mph.
However, the false belief and the actual belief are formed on the same basis, i.e., inference
from the belief that she is driving at 79 mph. Therefore, GLOBALIZED SAFETYP delivers
the incorrect verdict that her actual belief is unsafe and thus does not count as knowledge.
One might respond that, though Angela believes that she is driving at 79 mph, she also
forms an approximate belief, i.e., she is driving at approximately 79 mph, when reading the
speedometer and it is the approximate belief that is playing a role in inference while the exact
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belief is inferentially inert. Thus, the so-called “knowledge from falsehood” should be
re-described as knowledge despite falsehood (Ball & Bloome-Tillman, 2014). If she is
inferring from the approximate belief rather than the exact belief, then she would be more
cautious when making an inference. Though she is willing to infer that she is driving above
60 mph, she is reluctant to infer that she is driving above 75 mph. In that case, she could not
easily have falsely believed that she is driving above 75 mph. Therefore, she could not easily
have formed a false belief on the same basis and thus her belief that she is driving above 60
mph is safe on GLOBALIZED SAFETYP.
In response to the strategy which appeals to the approximate belief, we could fix the
case to the extent that Angela has a very strong reason to only form exact beliefs about the
speed:
SPEEDOMETER II: Angela regularly has the speedometer in her car calibrated at the
best local auto mechanic shop. The staff there always do an excellent job. In fact, Angela
uses a reliable radar speedometer to test if the speedometer in the car is accurate several
times. The numbers shown on both speedometers always match perfectly. Therefore,
Angela regularly accepts what the speedometer in her car says at face value.
One day, after having the speedometer calibrated again in the auto mechanic, she forms
the belief that she is driving at 79 mph by reading the speedometer on her way home.
However, she is actually driving at 74 mph. The problem is that the job was done by an
apprentice who is not familiar enough with calibration this time. After the calibration, the
speedometer does not get the speed right exactly but diverges by a few miles from the
true number. The error could be as large as 5 mph. Angela sees a posted speed limit of 60
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mph and goes on to infer that she is driving above 60 mph.
In this case, by reading the speedometer, Angela only forms an exact but false belief that
Angela is driving at 79 mph and infers that Angela is driving above 60 mph. Arguably, Angela
still knows that Angela is driving above 60 mph as the belief’s being true is not a matter of
luck. However, as argued above, she could easily have falsely believed Angela is driving
above 75 mph on the same basis, i.e., inference from the belief that she is driving at 79 mph.
Therefore, the problem for GLOBALIZED SAFETYP is still lurking around!
The proponents of the strategy which appeals to the approximate belief might argue that
it is psychologically implausible for Angela to only form the exact belief that Angela is
driving at 79 mph but not the approximate belief that she is driving at approximately 79 mph.
Even if we take a step back and grant that it is psychologically implausible to only form exact
beliefs, the problem is that the proponents of the strategy still need to demonstrate that it is
the approximate belief that is playing a role in inference while the exact belief is inferentially
inert. That would be a difficult task to complete.
In addition to cases of knowledge from/despite falsehood, we seem to have lots of cases
where knowledge is gained through inference from a true exact belief. If the exact belief is
inferentially inert in a case of knowledge from/despite falsehood, then we might wonder
whether exact beliefs are always inert in inferences. It could either be the case that, while
false exact beliefs are inferentially inert, true exact beliefs are not, or be the case that exact
beliefs are always inferentially inert. If the proponents of the strategy take the first horn, then
they still owe us an explanation of why whether a belief is true or not matters to whether it is
inferentially inert or not. If they take the second horn, then the burden of proof to demonstrate
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that exact beliefs are always inferentially inert is still on them. In either case, it is far from
satisfactory to claim that it is psychologically implausible to only form exact beliefs.
5. Possible Replies
I shall now briefly discuss two possible replies which are supposed to dissolve the
dilemma constituted by knowledge from falsehood and ignorance of necessary truths for the
safety theorists.
Timothy Williamson has proposed a different solution to how the set of relevant
propositions is constrained. Unlike Pritchard who thinks that we should only consider beliefs
that are formed on the same basis when evaluating whether the belief in the target proposition
is safe, he argues that a belief in a proposition that is formed on a different basis can also be
relevant to whether the belief in the target proposition is safe or not as long as the proposition
is close to the target proposition and the basis is also close to the actual basis. To put it
formally,
GLOBALIZED SAFETYW: S’s belief that p, formed on basis B, is safe, if and only if, in
all nearby possible worlds where S forms a belief in a proposition close to p on a basis
close to B, S’s belief is true (Williamson, 2000, 2009).
Williamson, as a knowledge-first epistemologist, also argues that the safety account of
knowledge is unable to settle on what counts as a basis, and what counts as a close
proposition, independently of a judgment about whether the subject knows that p. According
to his knowledge-first epistemology, though safety is a necessary condition on knowledge, we
should appeal to the intuition about knowledge to judge whether a belief is safe or not as well
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as what counts as a basis or a relevantly similar proposition rather than the other way around
(Williamson, 2000).
Understood in this way, one might argue that the proposition that she is driving above 75
mph is not close to the proposition that she is driving above 60 mph, and thus Angela’s belief
in the latter is safe; while the proposition that 131,071 is a composite number is close to the
proposition that 131,071 is a prime number and thus Sam’s belief in the latter is unsafe by
appeal to the intuition about knowledge.
To clarify, this paper mainly targets the safety theorists who take safety to be a necessary
and non-circular condition on knowledge. In addition, though this paper does not target the
safety theorists who take safety to be a necessary and circular condition on knowledge, I
think the account is not well-motivated. In order to see why it is safety rather than its
competitors, e.g., sensitivity, adherence, virtuous methods of belief-formation, that is
necessary for knowledge, a reasonable strategy is to see whether our judgments about safety
accommodate intuitions about knowledge. If judgments about safety accommodate intuitions
about knowledge while judgments about the competitors of safety fail to do so, then safety is
motivated as a necessary condition on knowledge. If, according to knowledge-first
epistemology, judgments about safety cannot be made without appeal to intuitions about
knowledge, then it is unclear why safety does a better job than its competitors to be motivated
as a necessary condition for knowledge. In short, the safety account which takes safety to be a
necessary and circular condition on knowledge is not as well-motivated as its counterpart
which takes safety to be a non-circular condition on knowledge.
This is not to deny the significant role of safety taken as a circular condition on
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knowledge in epistemology such as unveiling the structural properties of knowledge, figuring
in the anti-luminosity argument, and undermining the KK principle (Williamson, 2000). My
claim here is less ambitious to the extent that the safety account which takes safety to be a
necessary and circular condition on knowledge is not as well-motivated as its counterpart
which takes safety to be a non-circular condition on knowledge. Once again, it is the latter
that the paper mainly targets.
Hirvelä argues that we should only consider beliefs that are formed on the same virtuous
method and propositions which belong to the same subject matter of inquiry as the target
proposition. To put it formally,
GLOBALIZED SAFETYH: S’s belief that p, which belongs to her subject matter of
inquiry Q, formed on a virtuous method V, is safe, if and only if, in all nearby possible
worlds where S forms a belief in a proposition that belongs to Q via the virtuous method
V, S’s belief is true (Hirvelä, 2017, 2019).
Like GLOBALIZED SAFETYP, GLOBALIZED SAFETYH also handles ignorance of
necessary truths such as CALCULATOR nicely. Though Sam could not easily have formed a
false belief that 131,071 is a prime number, he could easily have formed a false belief that
131,071 is a composite number on the same virtuous method as that in the actual case. In
addition, the true proposition and the false propositions belong to the subject matter of
inquiry that “is 131,071 prime or composite?” Therefore, his belief in the target proposition is
unsafe and thus does not count as knowledge.
One might wonder if GLOBALIZED SAFETYH does a better job to account for
knowledge from falsehood such as SPEEDOMETER. This turns out to be the question of
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whether Angela’s actual belief in the true proposition that she is driving above 60 mph and
her counterfactual belief in the false proposition that she is driving above 75 mph belong to
the same subject matter of inquiry. As Hirvelä argues, the subject matter of inquiry is partially
determined by the practical interests of the subject. We should ask “what is the subject trying
to find out?” when individuating the subject matter of inquiry in a given case (Hirvelä, 2019).
One might argue that Angela is trying to find out whether she is driving above 60 mph or not.
In that case, while both she is driving above 60 mph and she is not driving above 60 mph are
potential answers to the question and thus belong to her subject matter of inquiry; she is
driving above 75 mph is not a potential answer to the question and thus does not belong to her
subject matter of inquiry. Therefore, Angela’s counterfactual belief in the false proposition is
irrelevant to whether her belief in the target proposition is safe or not. This is a welcome
result for GLOBALIZED SAFETYH.9
The bad news is that GLOBALIZED SAFETYH is too weak to eliminate
knowledge-precluding luck if the subject matter of inquiry is individuated by reference to the
practical interests of the subject. To illustrate, consider the following case,
MATHEMA: Mathema wonders if 12 × 13 is larger than 146. He uses a calculator to
calculate the difference between 12 × 13 and 146. The calculator correctly shows that the
difference is 10. As a result, Mathema believes that 12 × 13 is larger than 146 since the
difference is a positive number. Unbeknownst to Mathema, however, his calculator is in
fact broken such that it always generates a positive integer randomly as the “answer.”
Presumably, the belief that 12 × 13 is larger than 146 is true as a matter of luck and thus does
9 I thank an anonymous referee for this reply.
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not count as knowledge.
GLOBALIZED SAFETYP handles the case nicely: though Mathema could not easily
have formed a false belief that 12 × 13 is larger than 146,10 he could easily have formed a
false belief that 12 × 13 - 146 = 20 on the same basis as that in the actual case. However, this
solution is not available to the proponents of GLOBALIZED SAFETYH if the subject matter
of inquiry is individuated by reference to the practical interests of the subject. According to
this way of individuation, these propositions belong to different subject matters of inquiry:
since Mathema is trying to find out whether 12 × 13 is larger than 146 rather than the exact
difference between them, while the proposition that 12 × 13 is larger than 146 belongs to his
subject matter of inquiry; the proposition that 12 × 13 - 146 = 20 does not belong to his
subject matter of inquiry. If that is the case, then Mathema’s belief in the latter is irrelevant to
whether his belief in the former is safe or not. Therefore, GLOBALIZED SAFETYH delivers
the incorrect verdict that Mathema’s belief that 12 × 13 is larger than 146 is safe and thus it
is being true is not a matter of luck.
To conclude, in order to accommodate knowledge from falsehood such as
SPEEDOMETER, the subject matter of inquiry should be individuated by reference to the
practical interests of the subject. However, if the subject matter of inquiry is individuated that
way, then GLOBALIZED SAFETYH fails to eliminate knowledge-precluding luck in some
other cases.
10 One might argue that Mathema could easily have formed a false belief that 12 × 13 is smaller than 146.
After all, there are nearby possible worlds where he subtracts 12 × 13 from 146 rather than subtracts 146 from
12 × 13 while the calculator generates a positive integer as the “answer.” Nonetheless, we could fix the case
such that Mathema always has a strong inclination to perform multiplication before subtraction. This ensures
that he subtracts 146 from 12 × 13 rather than the other way around in nearby possible worlds.
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6. Conclusion
Knowledge from falsehood and ignorance of necessary truths constitute two horns of a
dilemma for the safety account of knowledge. On the one hand, knowledge from falsehood
requires the safety theorists to focus on the modal profile of the belief in the target
proposition. Otherwise, the belief in a case of knowledge from falsehood would turn out to be
unsafe. On the other hand, ignorance of necessary truths requires the safety theorists to focus
on the modal profile of the relevant doxastic output of the belief-forming process. Otherwise,
beliefs in necessary truths would be trivially safe. Either the safety condition is concerned
with the modal profile of the belief in the target proposition or it is concerned with the modal
profile of a relevant doxastic output of a belief-forming process but not both. The conclusion
is that there is no way that the safety theorists could account for both knowledge from
falsehood and ignorance of necessary truths.11
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